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EMPLOYER FREE SPEECH UNDER THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
By

JOSEPH

K.

POKEMPNER*

Perhaps no area in the dynamic and expanding field of labor law
has caused more heated comment and discussion1 than the decisions
which have regulated and sought to place limits on the right of expression by employers under the National Labor Relations Act 2 (hereinafter referred to as NLRA). The Constitution of the United States as
well as Section 8(c) of the NLRA guarantees to both employers and
unions the right to freedom of speech. But deciding just how far the
representatives of management and labor can go in exercising this
privilege constitutes a substantial field of litigation, both before the
NLRB and the federal courts.
Congressional desire to strike a balance between the employee's
right of self-organization as guaranteed by sections 7 and 8(a) (1) of
the Act,' and the employer's freedom to present his position in regard
to employee organization, within the framework of the first amendment
privilege, led to the amending of section 8 of the original Wagner Act
by adding subsection (c), which reads as follows:
"The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the
dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or
visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor
practice under any of the provisions of this Act, if such expression
contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefits." 4
The obvious import of the section 8(c) language is to protect
the expression of views, argument, or opinion unless such expression
* Of the Maryland Bar; A.B., Johns Hopkins, 1957; LL.B., University of Maryland, School of Law, 1962. Mr. Pokempner is an Associate in the law offices of
Earle K. Shawe.
1. See, e.g., Aaron, Employer Free Speech: The Search for a Policy in PUBLIC
POLICY AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (Aaron, Shister & Sumners eds. 1962) ; Bok,

The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the National
Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. Rev. 38 (1964) ; Christensen, Free Speech, Propaganda and the National Labor Relations Act, 38 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 243 (1963) ; Koretz,
Employer Interference with Union Organization Versus Employer Free Speech,
29 GEo. WASH. L. Rgv. 399 (1960); Shams, Employer Free Speech in Union
Organizing Campaigns, 15 U. FLA. L. Rxv. 231 (1962) ; Wollett & Rowen, Employer
Speech and Related Issues, 16 OHIO ST. L.J. 380 (1955).
2. Wagner Act - National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935); TaftHartley - Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, 29
U.S.C. §§ 141-44, 151-68, 171-82, 185-88 (1958) ; Landrum-Griffin - Labor Management Rep. and Disc. Act, 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-02, 411-15, 431-40,
461-66, 481-83, 501-04, 521-31 (Supp. V, 1964).
3. Section 7 reads: "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection .... 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 157 (1958). Section 8(a) (1) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in Section 7." 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1958). The
language of the above quoted sections is substantially the same as it was under the
corresponding Wagner Act sections 7 and 8(1).
4. 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1958).
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contains a threat of reprisal or force, or promise of benefit aimed at
interferring with employees' section 7 rights. It is to be kept in mind
that the Board, in order to find an unfair labor practice based on an
employer's speech, must first find that the speech interferred with,
restrained, or coerced his employees in the exercise of their rights
protected by section 7, including the right to form, join, or assist labor
organizations. Therefore, if there is no threat of reprisal or force or
promise of benefit, the expression does not violate section 8(a) (1)
since it is conduct specifically protected by section 8(c). Put another
way, the crux of the matter is not what is or is not "free speech" but
rather what is a threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.
FREE SPEECH UNDER THE WAGNER ACT THE DOCTRINE OF STRICT NEUTRALITY
Under the Wagner Act, the NLRB originally required an employer to maintain a position of strict neutrality toward a union's
attempt to organize his employees. 5 Regardless of non-coercive content,
employer speeches, notices, letters, handbills, and other forms of communications aimed at combating union organization were all subject to
Board censure by a finding of a section 8(1) violation." It was the
theory of the Board that the employer's superior economic position
created in his employees "an inherent fear of economic reprisal" such
as to make his slightest suggestion appear to be threatening and
coercive in nature.' As stated by the Seventh Circuit: "The position
of the employer . . . carries such weight and influence that his words
may be coercive when they would not be so if the relation of master and
servant did not exist."'
The strict neutrality, non-interference policy of the Board in
regard to employer "free speech" met with a varied reaction from the
several reviewing federal circuits. The Second and Seventh Circuits,
for the most part, agreed with the Board.9 The Fifth, Sixth, Ninth,
and District of Columbia Circuits disagreed.' ° Typical of their viewpoint is a Sixth Circuit decision which, although recognizing that
the use of influence amounting to interference, restraint or coercion
is plainly illegal, emphasized that: "Unless the right of free speech is
5. See, e.g., Nebel Knitting Co., 6 N.L.R.B. 284, 293 (1938), modified, 103 F.2d
594 (4th Cir. 1939) ; Knoxville Glove Co., 5 N.L.R.B. 559, 561-64 (1938).
6. See, e.g., Rockford Mitten & Hosiery Co., 16 N.L.R.B. 501, 5 L.R.R.M. 244
(1939); The Triplett Elec. Instrument Co., 5 N.L.R.B. 835, 2 L.R.R.M. 65 (1938)
(handbill); Pacific Greyhound Lines, Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 431, 1 L.R.R.M. 55 (1936)
(speech).
7. See, e.g., 3 NLRB ANN. REP. 59-62, 125 (1938); 2 NLRB ANN. REP. 65-66
(1937); 1 NLRB ANN. REP. 73-74 (1936).
8. NLRB v. Falk Corp., 102 F.2d 383, 389 (7th Cir. 1939).
9. See NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1941); and Valley Mould
& Iron Corp. v. NLRB, 116 F.2d 760 (7th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 590 (1941).
10. See Continental Box Co. v. NLRB, 113 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1940) ; Press Co. v.
NLRB, 118 F.2d 937 (D.C. Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 595 (1941); NLRB v.
Ford Motor Co., 114 F.2d 905 (6th Cir. 1940) ; NLRB v. Union Pacific Stages, Inc.,
99 F.2d 153 (9th Cir. 1938).
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enjoyed by employers as well as by employees, the guaranty of the First
Amendment is futile, for it is fundamental that the basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution belong equally to every person.'""
THE "TOTALITY

OF CONDUCT" DOCTRINE

The varying views of the circuit courts of appeal were clarified to
some extent when in 1941 the Supreme Court 'of the United States
issued its decision in NLRB v. Virginia Electric & Power Co." In
that case, the employer had posted a bulletin and had made two speeches
which were found by the Board to have interferred with, restrained,
and coerced the employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights.
The Supreme Court held that the NLRA does not preclude an employer
from expressing its views on labor policies or problems so long as
such utterances do not, by reason of other circumstances have a coercive
effect upon employees in their choice of a bargaining representative.
In holding that the employer was protected by the first amendment in
speaking out against a union organizing campaign, the Court in
remanding the case, instructed the Board to examine the speech (and
bulletin) in the totality of the employer's conduct, taking into account
the surrounding circumstances such as discriminatory discharges, acts
of hostility, and general over-all employer opposition to union organization in determining whether or not such speech was "coercive."
From the 1941 decision in Virginia Electric up to the Taft-Hartley
amendments of 1947, the Board continued to adhere in principle to the
criteria of the "totality of conduct" approach. The position of the Board
was succinctly stated in the Board's llth Annual Report (1946)
as follows:
"Statements containing an actual, implied, or veiled threat of
economic reprisal are coercive per se and are not privileged.
A more difficult problem arises in connection with statements
which on their face appear unobjectionable. In such a case the
Board does not consider the statement in isolation, but appraises
it in the light of the employer's entire course of conduct. Thus,
an otherwise privileged statement may acquire a coercive character
when accompanied by other unfair labor practices or when found
to be an inseparable and integral part of a course of antiunion
conduct, which in its 'totality' amounts to coercion within the
meaning of the Act."' 3
Shortly before the passage of section 8(c) of Taft-Hartley, the
Board in the Clark Bros. 4 case evolved its "captive audience" doctrine,
which placed major emphasis upon the circumstances in which the
anti-union statement was made, rather than upon the content of the
11. Midland Steel Products Co. v. NLRB, 113 F.2d 800, 804 (6th Cir. 1940).
12. 314 U.S. 469 (1941) ; Morgan, Employer's Freedom of Speech and the Wagner

Act, 20 TuL. L. REv. 469, 485 (1946).
13. 11 NLRB ANN. REP. 34 (1946). For similar statements of the Board's position see 10 NLRB ANN. REP. 37 (1945); 9 NLRB ANN. Rtp. 37-38 (1944); 8 NLRB
ANN. REP. 29-30 (1943); 7 NLRB ANN. REP. 43 (1942).

14. Clark Bros. Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 802, 18 L.R.R.M. 1360 (1946).
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speech. 5 In Clark Bros., employees were assembled during working
hours to listen to speeches by company officials one hour before the
polls opened in a run-off election between the CIO and an independent
employees association. In affirming the Trial Examiner's finding of
section 8(1) violation, the Board held that while the Act (section 7)
guarantees to employees "full freedom to receive aid, advice and information from others concerning those rights and their enjoyment,
such freedom is meaningless, however, unless the employees are also
free to determine whether or not to receive such aid, advice and information." The Board in conclusion stated, "To force employees to
receive such aid, advice, and information impairs that freedom; it is
calculated to, and does, interfere with the selection of a representative
of the employees' choice. And this is so, wholly apart from the
6 fact
that the speech itself may be privileged under the Constitution.'
The Second Circuit, while enforcing the Board's order, did so on
other grounds. The Court refused to accept the view that compelling
employees to assemble on company premises and listen to anti-union
speeches is a violation of that right per se. 17 The court stated:
"An employer has an interest in presenting his views on labor
relations to his employees. We should hesitate to hold that he
may not do this- on company time and pay, provided a similar
opportunity to address them were accorded representatives of the
union.'""
In suggesting that an employer's conduct in addressing his employees on company time and premises without granting a similar
opportunity to the union might be an unfair labor practice, the court
originated a major doctrinal development in the area of employer
speech. Later decisions, discussed below have viewed the question as
one of whether employers may address their employees on company time
and premises while denying the union an equal opportunity to reply.
DEVELOPMENTS UNDER TAFT-HARTLEY
While the legislative history of section 8(c) is said to contain
considerable ambiguity,' some things seem clear. Congress believed
that the decisions of the Board were too restrictive of the employer's
right of free speech in the expression of his views on labor matters
to his employees. 0 Congress was also convinced that the Board had
15. See Koretz, Employer Interference With Union Organization Versus Employer Free Speech, 29 Gso. WASH. L. Rev. 399, 404 (1960).
16. 70 N.L.R.B. 802, 805, 18 L.R.R.M. 1360 (1946).
17. 163 F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1947).
18. 163 F.2d at 376.
19. Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 61 HARV. L.
Rev. 1, 16-20 (1947).
20. Koretz, supra n.15, at 402-03. See Legislative History of The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1947):
"Although the old Labor Board protests it does not limit free speech, it is apparent
from decisions of the Board itself that what persons say in the exercise of their right
of free speech has been used against them. The bill provides that the new Board is
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gone too far in basing unfair labor practice charges on an employer's
speech, itself privileged, but found to be coercive because the employer
had been found guilty of some other unfair labor practice, even though
severable or unrelated. 2 By adding section 8(c) to the NLRA,
Congress declared that employer speech would no longer constitute an
unfair labor practice unless it contained a threat of reprisal or force
or promise of benefit.
Although section 8(c) cannot be read to indicate that all statements made by an employer, except those obviously coercive, are protected, it does seem clear that Congress intended to broaden the range
of permissible employer communication. 2 However, the Board in 1948,

in the General Shoe Corp.23 case, construed the language of section 8 (c)
literally, and held that it applied only to unfair labor practice cases
and not to representation cases. Thus the Board formulated a doctrine
that employer speech privileged under section 8(c) could provide the
basis for setting aside the election, even though nothing that was said
could be found to constitute an unfair labor practice in violation of
section 8(a) (1). The Board thus wound up where it had started with
respect to election cases prior to the enactment of section 8 (c). General
Shoe is of further significance because it established a principle as to
when an election should be set aside:
"In election proceedings, it is the Board's function to provide a
laboratory in which an experiment may be -conducted, under conditions nearly ideal as possible, to determine the uninhibited desires
of the employees. It is our duty to establish those conditions; it is
our duty to determine whether they have been fulfilled. When, in
the rare extreme case, the standard drops too low, because of our
fault . . . or that of others, the requisite laboratory conditions are
not present and the experiment must be conducted over again."24
In discussing the NLRB and court decisions relating to "free
speech," it is convenient to separate the decisions into two separate
but related headings: (1) Decisions as to Where, When and How a
speech may be delivered; (2) Decisions relating to the actual content
of the speech itself.
prohibited from using as evidence against an employer, an employee, or a union any
statement that by its own terms does not threaten force or economic reprisal." See
also S. RP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 23-24 (1947): "The Board has placed a
limited construction upon these decisions [Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945)
and NLRB v. American Tube Bending Co., 134 F.2d 993 (1943)] by holding such
speeches by employers to be coercive if the employer was found guilty of some other
unfair labor practice, even though severable or unrelated [Monumental Life Insurance, 69 N.L.R.B. 247 (1946)], or if the speech was made in the plant on working
time [Clark Brothers, 70 N.L.R.B. 802 (1946)]. The Committee believes these
decisions to be too restrictive, and, in this section (Sec. 8(c)), provides that if, under
all the circumstances, there is neither an expressed or implied threat of reprisal, force,
nor offer of benefit, the Board shall not predicate any finding of unfair labor practice
upon the statement."
21. Koretz, supra, note 15. See Wollett & Rowen, Employer Speech and Related
Issues, 16 OHIO ST. L.J. 380, 384-85 (1955).
22. 13 NLRB ANN. RzP. 49 (1948).
23. 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 21 L.R.R.M. 1337 (1948).
24. 77 N.L.R.B. at 127.
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WHERE, WHEN AND HOW AN EMPLOYER
MAY SPEAK
Apparently, because of the legislative history of section 8(c) of
Taft-Hartley, 25 the Board felt required to abandon the "captive audience" doctrine of the Clark Bros. case. 26 For the next few years NLRB
regional directors and trial examiners continued to apply the "captive
audience" doctrine as modified by the Second Circuit, 27 but the Board
as a matter of course. overruled them, or based its conclusions on other
grounds.2 1 Typical"6f the cases demonstrating the Board's shift is
S & S Corrugated-Paper Machinery Co. 29 There, the Regional
Director found that-two pre-election speeches made by the president
of the company to employees during working hours, although constituting "captive audience" speeches, were within the bounds of free
speech. However, he further found that the employer, by ignoring
the union's request for a similar opportunity to address the employees,
interfered with their free choice of a bargaining representative. The
Board, resting its decision on the Babcock & Wilcox 3" case, overruled
the Regional Director's finding on the ground that the speeches were
protected by section 8(c) and the employer's denial of an equal opportunity to use its facilities was therefore not illegal.
Thus, by 1950, it appeared that the last vestiges of the "captive
audience" doctrine had been laid to rest by the Board decisions in the
Babcock & Wilcox:and S & S Corregated Paper cases. It further
appeared that the "equal opportunity" approach advocated by the
Second Circuit in its enforcing opinion had died aborning.
However, the Board allowed the "captive audience" doctrine to
lie dormant for only a little over a year before it was resurrected under
a different label. For whatever reason," x the Board, in 1951, seized
upon the "equal opportunity" doctrine suggested by the Second Circuit

and applied it in Bonwit Teller, Inc. 2 In Bonwit Teller, Inc., the
employer, a retail department store, had a valid rule forbidding union
solicitation by employees and union organizers on the selling floor, at
all times.3" In the week prior to the election, the employer's president
25. See note 20, supra.
26. 70 N.L.R.B. 802, 18 L.R.R.M. 1360 (1946), overruled by Babcock & Wilcox,
77 N.L.R.B. 577, 578, 22 L.R.R.M. 1057, where the Board stated: "the language of
Section 8(c) of the amended Act, and its legislative history, make it clear that the
doctrine of the Clark Bros. case no longer exists as a basis for finding unfair labor
practices in circumstances such as this record discloses."
27. NLRB v. Clark Bros. Co., 163 F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1947).
28. See Note, Limitations Upon an Employer's Right of Non-coercive Free Speech,
38 VA. L. REv. 1037, 1050 (1952).
29. 89 N.L.R.B. 1363. 26 L.R.R.M. 1112 (1950).
30. 77 N.L.R.B. 577, 22 L.R.R.M. 1057 (1948).
31. See Wollett & Rowen, supra note 21, at 390. They suggest that the reemergence of the "equal opportunity" doctrine was due to a persisting belief by the Board
that "captive audiences" should in some form be regulated. They suggest that in
resurrecting the "equal opportunity" doctrine, the Board was looking for a doctrine which would survive the scrutiny of the circuit courts and conform with the
congressional intent enunciated in the legislative history of Section 8(c) ; neither the
American Tube Bending Co. nor Clark Bros. decisions have satisfied these requirements.
32. 96 N.L.R.B. 608, 28 L.R.R.M. 1547 (1951).
33. "Normally, an employer cannot forbid union solicitation on company property
during non-working time even where there is no showing that solicitation away from
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gave a series of speeches designed to influence the employees to vote
against the union. On one occasion, the employer closed its doors to
the public one-half hour early and the president delivered his speech to
a massed audience of store employees assembled on the mainselling
floor. Several days later, the union wrote to the employer requesting
an opportunity to address the employees under conditions comparable
to those under which the employer's speeches were given; however, the
employer did not reply. The union lost the election and thereupon filed
objections to the election and section 8(a)(1) charges, seeking to
have the election results set aside.3 4 In setting aside the election, and
in finding the employer guilty of section 8(a) (1) violation, the Board,
relying on the Second Circuit's decision in the Clark Bros. 5 case, and
overruling S & S CorrugatedPaper, stated:
"We believe that the right of employees, guaranteed by Section
7 of the Act, freely to select or reject representation by a labor
organization necessarily encompasses the right to hear both sides
of the story under circumstances which reasonably approximate
equality. . . . [A]n employer who chooses to use his premises
to assemble his employees and speak against a union may not
deny that union's reasonable request for the same opportunity to
present its case, where the circumstances are such that only by
granting such request will the employees have a reasonable opportunity to hear both sides."3 6
On appeal, the Second Circuit held that "neither Section 8(c) nor any
issue of 'employer free speech' is involved in this case '3 7 but that at
issue was the employer's discriminatory application of the no-solicitation rule. In holding the Board's remedial order to be too broad, the
cohurt stated:
"If Bonwit Teller were to abandon that rule, [no solicitation
within the selling areas of the store during both working and nonworking hours] we do not think it would then be required to
the plant would be ineffective." Bonwit Teller, Inc. v. NLRB, 197 F.2d 640, 645 (2d
Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 905 (1953). See Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB,
324 U.S. 793 (1945). However, the Board has allowed retail department stores the
privilege of prohibiting all solicitation within the selling areas of the store during both
working and non-working hours; see May Department Stores, 59 N.L.R.B. 976, 981,
15 L.R.R.M. 173, enforced as modified, 154 F.2d 533 (8th Cir. 1946), cert. denied,
329 U.S. 725 (1946).
34. The filing of an unfair labor practice charge under Section 8 of the Act and
the filing of objections to conduct affecting an election under Rule 102.69 of the Board's
Rules and Regulations involve two separate and distinct proceedings. The remedy
for a valid unfair labor practice charge is a cease and desist order requiring the guilty
party to refrain from specified unlawful activity and/or to take certain remedial action,
e.g., reinstate an unlawfully discharged employee. The remedy in an objections to
election proceeding is the setting aside of the election and the direction of a new one.
As illustrated in the Bonwit-Teller case, above, the union took advantage of both
proceedings and emerging successful in both, obtained a new election as well as a
Board order directing the employer to cease and desist from various illegal activity.
35. See specifically footnotes 12 and 13 at 96 N.L.R.B. 608, 614, 28 L.R.R.M.
1547 (1951).
36. Bonwit Teller, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. at 612.
37. Bonwit Teller, Inc. v. NLRB, 197 F.2d 640, 645 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
345 U.S. 905 (1953).
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accord the union a similar opportunity to address the employees
each time [the company president] made an anti-union speech.
Nothing in the Act nor the reason compels such 'an eye for an eye,
a tooth for a tooth' result so long as the avenues of communication are kept open to both sides."" 8
The employer was therefore given a choice in regard to future
employee speech making. He could choose between taking advantage
of his special privilege as a retail store and bar union organizers from
the sales floors at all times and desist from making such speeches
without granting the union's request. Or, he could surrender his nosolicitation privilege, thereby opening up his premises to union solicitation during non-working hours, make such speeches, and refuse the
union's request for a similar opportunity to address employees everytime he made an anti-union speech.
Despite the Second Circuit's rejection of the Board's "broad"
order as framed in the Bonwit Teller case, 39 the Board continued
directing employers to stop making speeches on company property without granting a similar opportunity to the union, failing to take into
consideration such circumstances as the absence of a broad no-solicitation rule and the availability to the union of alternate means of communication with the employees.40
Where the Second Circuit and Congress had failed in their efforts
to revise Board policy, a change in the national administration brought
about such a revision with almost immediate and relative ease. The
advent of the new Republican administration in 1953 caused a change
in Board membership resulting in the formulation of new Board doctrine, as announced in the Livingston Shirt Corp.4 ' and Peerless
Plywood Co.4 2 cases. This doctrine, for the most part, has retained
its validity to the present date.
In the Livingston Shirt case, two elections were held. Approximately 25 hours before the first election, the company president delivered a non-coercive, anti-union speech during working hours to his
assembled employees while denying a subsequent union request on a
similar opportunity to reply. The Union lost the first election but, the
NLRB Regional Director, relying on the Board's Bonwit Teller doctrine, set it aside. Several days prior to the second election, the company president delivered another non-coercive, anti-union speech to a
group of assembled employees during working hours and the union
repeated its request to reply under similar circumstances; such request
38. 197 F.2d at 646.
39. Order - Cease and desist from: "(a) . . . (b) During an organizational
campaign by a labor organization, making anti-union speeches to the Respondent's
employees during working hours and on the Respondent's premises, without according, upon reasonable request, a similar opportunity to address the employees to the
labor organization against which such speeches are directed." 96 N.L.R.B. 608, 615,
28 L.R.R.M. 1547 (1951).
40. See, e.g., Metropolitan Auto Parts, Inc., 99 N.L.R.B. 401, 30 L.R.R.M. 1079
(1952) ; Onondago Pottery Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 1143, 30 L.R.R.M. 1412 (1952) ; Wilson
& Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 1512, 30 L.R.R.M. 1479 (1952); National Screw & Mfg. Co. of
Calif., 101 N.L.R.B. 1360, 31 L.R.R.M. 1208 (1952).
41. 107 N.L.R.B. 400, 33 L.R.R.M. 1156 (1953).
42. 107 N.L.R.B. 427, 33 L.R.R.M. 1151 (1953).

1965]

EMPLOYER FREE SPEECH

was again denied by the employer. The union lost the election but this
time filed charges with the Board alleging illegal interference in violation of section 8(a) (1) of the Act.
A majority of the Board, in affirming the Trial Examiner, held
that an employer does not violate section 8(a) (1) of the Act by making
a speech to his employees on company time and property while denying the union's request for a similar opportunity to reply, since the
employer's rule, which prohibited solicitation only during working
hours, was a legitimate regulation, and the union was allowed access
to the premises during non-working hours. Chairman Farmer and
Member Rodgers basing their decision squarely on section 8(c) stated,
"If the privilege of free speech is to be given real meaning, it cannot
be qualified by grafting upon it conditions which are tantamount to
negation." '4 3 The majority found that the Bonwit Teller doctrine was
not only un-unrealistic but without any actual support in the statute or
legislative history and concluded with a statement of the present rule
in regard to employee speeches on company time:
".. . absent special circumstances as hereinafter indicated, there

is nothing improper in an employer refusing to grant to the
union a right equal to his own in his plant. We rule therefore
that, in the absence of either an unlawful broad no-solicitation rule
(prohibiting union access to company premises on other than
working time) or a privileged no-solicitation rule (broad, but not
unlawful because of the character of the business),14 an employer
does not commit an unfair labor practice if he makes a pre-election
speech on company time and premises to his employees
and denies
' 45
the union's request for an opportunity to reply."
In the Peerless Plywood case, issued the same day as Livingston
Shirt, the employer delivered a speech to his employees on company
time and premises less than 24 hours prior to an election. A Board
majority pointed out that although they had in the Livingston Shirt
case abandoned the Bonwit Teller doctrine in complaint cases, this did
not dispose of the problem as it affected the conduct of elections. The
majority, viewing last minute speeches as having an unwholesome
effect on free choice,46 announced a new election rule:
"Accordingly, we now establish an election rule which will be
applied in all election cases. This rule shall be that employer and
unions alike will be prohibited from making election speeches on
company time to massed assemblies of employees within twentyfour (24) hours before the scheduled time for conducting an
election. Violation of this rule will cause the election to be set
aside whenever valid objections are filed." 4 7
43. 107 N.L.R.B. at 405.
44. Marshall Field & Co., 98 N.L.R.B. 88, 29 L.R.R.M. 1305, enforced as mnodified,
200 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1952).

45. 107 N.L.R.B. at 408 (1953).
46. 107 N.L.R.B. 427, 429, 33 L.R.R.M. 1151 (1953).
47. Ibid.
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As to those methods of pre-election conduct not affected by the
new rule, the Board stated:
"This rule will not interfere with the rights of unions or employers to circulate campaign literature on or off the premises
at any time prior to an election, nor will it prohibit the use of any
other legitimate campaign propaganda or media. It does not, of
course, sanction coercive speeches or other conduct prior to the
twenty-four hour period, nor does it prohibit an employer from
making (without granting the union an opportunity to reply)
campaign speeches on company time prior to the twenty-four hour
period, provided, of course, such speeches are not otherwise violative of section 8(a) (1). Moreover, the rule does not prohibit
employers or unions from making campaign speeches on or off
company premises during the twenty-four hour period if employee
attendance is voluntary and on the employees' own time."4
While it might have been hoped that the decision in the Livingston
Shirt case had finally cleared up the confused situation existing in
regard to the application of no-solicitation rules (privileged and nonprivileged), such was not the case. In the first case to be decided after
Livingston, the Board in F. W. Woolworth Co.49 held, as it indicated
it would in Livingston, that the employer in refusing to honor the
union's request for equal time to address its employees, after the employer had delivered two non-coercive anti-union speeches to assembled
employees on company time and property, had applied its no-solicitation rule (broad but privileged) in a discriminatory manner, therefore violating section 8(a) (1) of the Act. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit refused to enforce the Board's order."°
Following Woolworth, came two cases that were eventually to
reach the Supreme Court. In Nutone, Inc., 1 the issue before the circuit court as stipulated by the parties, was:
"Whether an employer commits an unfair labor practice if, during a pre-election period, it enforces an otherwise valid rule
against employee distribution of union literature in the plant, while,
during that same period, itself distributing non-coercive anti48. 107 N.L.R.B. at 430. The Peerless Plywood rule has been refined in subsequent board decisions. See United States Gypsum Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 734, 37 L.R.R.M.
1374 (1956) ; Robbins Packing Corp., 115 N.L.R.B. 1429, 38 L.R.R.M. 1092 (1956) ;
Mid-South Mfg. Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 1786, 40 L.R.R.M. 1092 (1957); Cross Co., 107
N.L.R.B. 1267, 1270, 33 L.R.R.M. 1364 (1954); National Dairy Products Corp., 122
N.L.R.B. 1318, 43 L.R.R.M. 1311 (1959) ; Montgomery Ward & Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 52,
40 L.R.R.M. 1444 (1957) ; Globe Motors, Inc., 123 N.L.R.B. 30, 43 L.R.R.M. 1365
(1959) ; The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 111 N.L.R.B. 623, 35 L.R.R.M. 1537
(1955); Camp Milling Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 471, 34 L.R.R.M. 1360 (1954); AllisChalmers Mfg. Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 744, 39 L.R.R.M. 1317 (1957) ; But cf., Celanese
Corp. v. NLRB, 279 F.2d 204 (7th Cir. 1960). See also Shirks Motor Express, 113
N.L.R.B. 753, 36 L.R.R.M. 1380 (1955) ; Granite State Veneer, Inc., 123 N.L.R.B.
1497, 44 L.R.R.M. 1154 (1959) ; Wate, Inc., 123 N.L.R.B. 301, 43 L.R.R.M. 1422 (1959).
49. 102 N.L.R.B. 581, 31 L.R.R.M. 1347 (1953).
50. NLRB v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 214 F.2d 78 (6th Cir. 1954).
51. 112 N.L.R.B. 1153, 36 L.R.R.M. 1165 (1955).
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union literature within the plant in a context of other unfair labor
5' 2
practices, committed prior to the election period and thereafter.
The Board had concluded: "Valid plant rules against solicitation and
other forms of union activity do not control an employer's actions.
Management prerogative certainly extends far enough so as to permit
an employer to make rules that do not bind himself."'5 3 The Board
found the Livingston Shirt case to be controlling and stated, "[H]ere,
like there, the Employer's expressed arguments contained no threats,
promises of benefits, or otherwise coercive statements." 4 Therefore,
the Board found the literature and its distribution protected by
section 8(c) of the Act. The District of Columbia Circuit did not
agree.55 In reversing, the court recognized that section 8(c) "wipes out
the taint of discrimination" from a non-coercive anti-union speech,
however, "it does not wipe out the basic rule that in order to enforce
a no-distribution rule against employees the employer must have a
valid reason."5 6 The court suggested a valid reason would be: needs
of production, preservation of order, cleanliness, or discipline. The
court found no such valid reason present and specifically stated its
disagreement with the majority opinion of the Sixth Circuit in the
Woolworth case which held section 8(c) rights not to be subject to
dilution by the existence of a no-solicitation rule.
In Avondale Mills, 57 the Board held that the company's no-solicita-

tion rule was invoked and applied for discriminatory reasons. The
Fifth Circuit, disagreeing, refused to enforce that part of the Board's
order.5 " The Supreme Court decided the Nutone and Avondale cases
together,59 holding first, that no-solicitation rules were valid, and
second, that their enforcement involved no unfair labor practice. In
framing the issue, Mr. Justice Frankfurter found the question to be
"very narrow and almost abstract," deriving from the claim that "when
the employer himself engages in anti-union solicitation that if engaged
in by employees would constitute a violation of the rule

. . .

his enforce-

ment of an otherwise valid no-solicitation rule against the employees is
itself an unfair labor practice." 60 The Court continued:
"... to lay down such a rule of law would show indifference to
the responsibilities imposed by the Act primarily on the Board to
appraise carefully the interests of both sides of any labor-management controversy in the diverse circumstances of particular cases
Board's special understanding of these indusand in light of the
61
trial situations."

52. United Steelworkers of America CIO v. NLRB, 243 F.2d 593, 596 (D.C.
Cir. 1956).
53. 112 N.L.R.B. at 1154.
54. 112 N.L.R.B. at 1154-55.
55. 243 F.2d 593 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
56. 243 F.2d at 600.
57. 115 N.L.R.B. 840, 37 L.R.R.M. 1423 (1956).
58. NLRB v. Avondale Mills, 242 F.2d 669 (5th Cir. 1957).
59. NLRB v. United Steelworkers of America CIO, 357 U.S. 357 (1938).
60. 357 U.S. at 362.
61. 357 U.S. at 362-63.
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Noting that no attempt was made in either case to show that the nosolicitation rules truly diminished the ability of the unions involved to
carry their messages to the employees, the Court stated, ". . . the TaftHartley Act does not command that labor organizations as a matter of
abstract law, under all circumstances, be protected in the use of every
possible means of reaching the minds of individual workers, nor that
they are entitled to use a medium of communication simply because
the employer is using it."62 The Court continued:
"If, by virtue of the location of the plant and of the facilities
and resources available to the union, the opportunities for effectively reaching the employees with a pro-union message, in spite
of a no-solicitation rule, are at least as great as the employer's
ability to promote the legally authorized expression of his antiunion views, there is no basis for invalidating these 'otherwise
valid' rules.""3
In conclusion, the Court stated, "We do not at all imply that the enforcement of a valid no-solicitation rule by an employer who is at the
same time engaging in anti-union solicitation may not constitute an
unfair labor practice. All we hold is that there must be some basis, in
the actualities of industrial relations, for such a finding."6 4
Commenting on the impact of Nutone and Avondale on employer
speech, in the light of the Board's Livingston Shirt rule, Professor
Koretz surmises, "The Court seems clearly to reject the suggestion
of Woolworth that section 8(c) grants an absolute privilege irrespective of attendant circumstances. But it also seems to reject the implication of Livingston Shirt, and the Second Circuit's ruling in Bonwit
Teller, that the presence of a broad but privileged no-solicitation rule
automatically transmutes the exercise of the employer's free speech
65
Another
privilege under Section 8(c) into an unfair labor practice."
leading commentator on the Labor-Management scene, Professor Benjamin Aaron, suggests that as a result of Nutone and Avondale, it is
doubtful that the presence of either a broad but privileged no-solicitation rule or an unlawful broad no-solicitation rule will automatically
convert the otherwise privileged exercise of free speech into an unfair
labor practice. Thus, he states, ". . . the Board will be required to
determine in each case, not only the validity of a no-solicitation rule,
but also whether the union has the ability, 'at least as great' as that of
the employer, 'effectively' to reach the employees with its message by
other means than inplant solicitation." 66
In the Walton Mfg. Co. 67 case, the Board undertook to restate
the law with respect to no-solicitation rules and no-distribution rules:
62. 357 U.S. at 364.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Koretz, Employer Interference with Union Organization Versus Employer
Free Speech, 29 GEo. WASH. L. Rxv. 399, 408 (1960). See also 57 Micn. L. lev.
615, 617 (1959).
66. Aaron, Employer Free Speech: The Search for a Policy, from PUBLIC PoLicy
AND COLLUCTivx BARGAINING 46 (Aaron, Schister and Summers ed. 1962).
67. 126 N.L.R.B. 697, 45 L.R.R.M. 1370 (1960), enforced 289 F.2d 177 (5th
Cir. 1961).
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"1. No-solicitation or no-distribution rules which prohibit
union solicitation or distribution of union literature on company
property by employees during their nonworking time are presumptively an unreasonable impediment to self-organization, and are
therefore presumptively invalid both as to their promulgation and
enforcement; however, such rules may be validated by evidence
that special circumstances make the rule necessary in order to
maintain production or discipline.
2. No-solicitation or no-distribution rules which prohibit
union solicitation or distribution of union literature by employees
during working time are presumptively valid as to their promulgation, in the absence of evidence that the rule was adopted for a
discriminatory purpose; and are presumptively valid as to their
enforcement, in the absence of evidence that the rule was unfairly applied.
3. No-solicitation or no-distribution rules which prohibit
union solicitation or distribution of union literature by non-employee union organizers at anytime on the employer's property are
presumptively valid, in the absence of a showing that the union
cannot reasonably reach the employees with its message in any
other way, or a showing that the employer's notice discriminates
against the union by allowing other solicitation or distribution."6"
In applying these rules to the facts in Walton, the Board concluded:
"We have here a no-solicitation and no-distribution rule applicable to employees during their non-working time, which rule
is presumptively invalid, in the absence of evidence that special
circumstances make the rule necessary in order to maintain production or discipline. As Respondent [employer] introduced no
evidence to show such special circumstances, the rule is invalid.

We find, therefore, in agreement with the Trial Examiner, that
Respondent's promulgation of the rule was a violation of Section 8(a) (1)."6 9
The Board rules in regard to employee distribution of literature
as distinguished from oral solicitation were crystallized in the StoddardQuirk70 case. In regard to employer sanctions on the distribution of
literature by employees, the Board laid down the following rules:
(1) A rule forbidding distribution of union literature by
employees in working areas will be presumptively valid even
though it applies both to working and nonworking time.
(2) A rule forbidding distribution in nonworking areas during nonworking time will be presumptively invalid.
68. 126 N.L.R.B. at 697-98.
69. Walton Mfg. Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 697, 699,45 L.R.R.M. 1370 (1960).
70. 138 N.L.R.B. 615, 51 L.R.R.M. 1110 (1962).
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After discussing the distinction between no-solicitation and nodistribution rules, the Board majority concluded:
"To sum up, we believe that to effectuate organizational rights
through the medium of oral solicitation, the right of employees
to solicit on plant premises must be afforded subject only to the
restriction that it be on nonworking time. However, because distribution of literature is a different technique and poses different
problems both from the point of view of the employees and from
the point of view of management, we believe organizational rights
in that regard require only that employees have access to nonworking areas of the plant premises."'"
The Board's holding in Stoddard-Quirk to the effect that a rule
forbidding distribution of union literature in nonworking areas during
nonworking time would be presumptively invalid was given approval
by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the recent case of
NLRB v. United Aircraft Corp."2 The court noted that rules forbidding solicitation or distribution of literature by employees on their
own time, in nonworking areas may be upheld only on a showing that
special circumstances make the rule necessary to maintain production
or discipline. The employer argued as justification for the no-distribution rule, that the lack of such rule resulted in a littering of company
property, unruly demonstrations in the plant cafeteria, and abusive language being used by a distributor. In rejecting this defense, the court
stated, "Since litter is inevitable when leaflets are distributed and since
the literature did not cause the disturbance in the cafeteria, respondent
has clearly failed to show special circumstances making its rule necessary for the maintenance of production or discipline." 7
As to the employer's contention that the Board erred in failing to
consider whether the employees had alternative means of communication, the court held that "[T] he chances are negligible that alternatives
equivalent to solicitation in the plant itself would exist." 74 The court
concluded, citing with approval Peyton Packing Co., 75 quoted with
approval in Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB,76 ". . . It is therefore
not within the province of an employer to promulgate and enforce a
rule prohibiting union solicitation by an employee outside of working
hours, although on company property. Such a rule must be presumed
to be an unreasonable impediment to self-organization and therefore
discriminatory in the absence of evidence that special circumstances
'1 7 7
make the rule necessary in order to maintain production or discipline.
While granting approval of one aspect of the Board's StoddardQuirk formula, in regard to the presumptive invalidity of a rule forbidding employees to distribute union leaflets in nonwork areas during
nonworking times, the court, since the issue was not before it, made no
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

138 N.L.R.B. at 621.
324 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1963).
324 F.2d at 129.
324 F.2d at 130.
49 N.L.R.B. 828, 12 L.R.R.M. 183 (1943).
324 U.S. 793, 803 n.10 (1945).
324 F.2d at 131.
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decision as to the more controversial of the:Stoddard-Quirk rules that an employer may forbid distribution of literature in working areas
during both working and nonworking time. No petition for review
having been filed in the Stoddard-Quirk case, a court ruling on this
point will have to await some later case.
In differing with the Court of Appeals for !the Third Circuit,7
the court in United Aircraft failed to regard the availability of alternative means of communication as being relevant,: since it would limit
evaluation of this factor to cases involving in-plant distribution or
solicitation by outside union organizers.
The Board, recognizing conditions peculiar to the retail department stores allows retail sales enterprises to promulgate and enforce
broad, no-solicitation rules prohibiting union solicitation by employees
or non-employees in selling areas of the store during both working
and nonworking hours.7 9
In May Department Stores Company"° the employer had enforced
a broad, but lawful, no-solicitation rule. Just prior to the election, the
employer delivered several noncoercive anti-union speeches to massed
assemblies of employees on company time and property, thereafter denying the union's request for an opportunity to address the same employees under the same circumstances. After losing the election, the
union filed both objections and an unfair labor practice charge, claiming that the employer's refusal to grant its request to reply constituted
a violation of section 8(a) (1) as well as grounds for setting aside the
election. In distinguishing the Livingston Shirt, Babcock & Wilcox,
and the Nutone case relied on by the employer, the majority stated:
"The no-solicitation rule enforced by Respondent is one which
seriously impaired the right of employees to discuss union organization on company premises during non-working as well as working time and this created an imbalance in the opportunities for
organizational communication. Respondent's rule is broader than
the valid rule involved in the Nutone case, which restricted employees' discussion of such matters only during their working time,
but left them free to discuss and evaluate such matters during
their nonworking time."'"
On petition for review filed by the employer, the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit set aside and denied enforcement of the Board's
78. See NLRB v. Rockwell Mfg. Co. (DuBois Div.), 271 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1959).
In this case, decided three years before the Board's decision in Stoddard-Qu irk, the
court held the employer not guilty of an unfair labor practice in enforcing a rule
prohibiting distribution of all literature on its property against employees distributing
union literature on its parking lot, where there were sidewalks near the plant where
union literature could be distributed, practically all the employees lived in the local
small town, the rule had been in force for a number of years, and alterations might
have resulted because of strong pro-union and strong anti-union sentiments among
employees if union literature was distributed on the parking lot.
79. Marshall Field & Company, 98 N.L.R.B. 88, 29 L.R.R.M. 1305 (1952); May
Department Stores Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 976, 15 L.R.R.M. 173 (1944).
80. 136 N.L.R.B. 797, 49 L.R.R.M. 1862 (1962).
81. 136 N.L.R.B. at 800.
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order, in an opinion which closely paralleled member Rodgers' dissent
from the Board decision. The unanimous court castigated the Board
for resurrecting "an obligation owed by the employer to non-employee
organizers which the Supreme Court in Babcock & Wilcox put to
rest."" The court stated: "That a speech during working time on
company premises may be preferable to use of contacts away from the
work-site cannot in and of itself render the employer's conduct unfair
under the Act." ' The court noted that there were no findings by the
Board of non-accessibility and no showing that the employees, away
from the employer's premises, were removed or isolated from normal,
usual communications. In fact, the court observed, the record indicated
that the employees were accessible through alternative channels.
The court concluded with the following terse statement:
"The Board majority's reliance on Bonwit-Teller, Inc. v. NLRB
is misplaced as we regard this decision inconsistent with Nutone
and Babcock & Wilcox. We consider our approach to be in
accord with the Supreme Court's decision in Nutone, for neither
the use of the magic word 'imbalance' nor the characterization of
alternative avenues of communication as 'ineffective' by the use
of a measure inapplicable to non-employee organizers can give the
Union a right of access which the Supreme Court of the United
States has refused to recognize and which it does not possess. '"84
In NLRB v. United Steelworkers (Nutone, Inc. ),8'
the Supreme
Court made it clear that the Bonwit Teller rule was no longer applicable.
The Court, in citing the dissenting opinion in Bonwit-Teller, Inc. v.
NLRBsO
and the concurring opinion in NLRB v. F. W. Woolworth
8
Co.

'

both to the effect that "Neither the constitution, the Common law,

nor the Labor-Management Relations Act confers upon employees the
right to use for union purposes the property of their employer during
working hours, over the objections of the employer,"8 8 stated:
"Of course the rules had the effect of closing off one channel
of communication; but the Taft-Hartley Act does not command
that labor organizations as a matter of abstract law, under all circumstances, be protected in the use of every possible means of
reaching the minds of individual workers, nor that they are entitled to use a medium of communication simply because the employer is using it ....

No such mechanical answers will avail for

82. May Department Stores Co. v. NLRB, 316 F.2d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 1963).
83. 316 F.2d at 800. See also NLRB v. Seamprufe, Inc., 222 F.2d 858, 861 (10th
Cir. 1955), where the Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit held that "absent a
showing of non-accessibility amounting to a handicap to self-organization," nonemployee solicitors have no right of access to company premises, inasmuch as they are
"strangers to the [employees guaranteed] right of self-organization." Aff'd with
Ranco, Inc. v. Labor Board, 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
84. 316 F.2d at 801.
85. 357 U.S. 357 (1958).
86. 197 F.2d 640, 646 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 905 (1953).
87. 214 F.2d 78, 83 (6th Cir. 1954).
88. 214 F.2d at 85.
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the solution of this non-mechanical, complex problem in labormanagement relations. If, by virtue of the location of the plant
and of the facilities and resources available to the union, the
opportunities for effectively reaching the employees with a prounion message, in spite of a no-solicitation rule, are at least as
great as the employer's ability to promote the legally authorized
expression of his anti-union views, there is no basis for invalidating these 'otherwise valid' rules."" 9
The question as to just how the Board would accept the Sixth
Circuit's renunciation of the Bonwit-Teller rule was soon answered in
Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc." After the union lost the election, it
filed objections because the employer had made a speech on company
time and property and refused a union request for equal time. The issue
before the Board therefore differed from that in the May Company case,
because the no-solicitation rule of the May Company was lawful.
Despite this opportunity to distinguish Montgomery Ward from
the May Company case, and despite the Sixth Circuit's reversal of its
decision in May Company, the Board nevertheless seized this first
opportunity to assert it would adhere to its decision in the May Company case. The Board proceeded to reaffirm its idea that the employer
was obligated to grant the union's request for equal time to address the
employees on the employer's premises. The Board invalidated the
election and ordered a new election. With the Board and the Sixth
Circuit in complete disagreement over the issue, it is apparent that the
problem will not be resolved until there is another decision by the
United States Supreme Court.
While private non-coercive interviews with employees are legitimate, the Board has issued a number of decisions dealing specifically
with the place at which the interview is conducted. 9 Even if the particular communication is in no way coercive, the protection accorded to employer speech by section 8(c) is of no avail if the interview took place
in what the Board has come to call a locus of managerial authority.
Illustrative of this point is National Caterers of Virginia92 where the
employer called employees from their work stations for individual interviews in the corner of a storeroom which also contained the manager's
desk, for the purpose of urging them to reject the union in a pending
election. The Board held this to be interference warranting the setting
aside of the election. The Board felt that the unusual act of setting up
two chairs in the corner of the storeroom reasonably led the employees
to believe that the location of the chairs rather than the manager's desk
was the locus of managerial authority, and that such conduct had a coercive effect upon the employees' free choice in the election,93 a bit of post
facto inductive reasoning which contains more ingenuity than substance.
89. 357 U.S. at 363-64.
90. 145 N.L.R.B. 846, 55 L.R.R.M. 1063 (1964).

91. Decisions regarding the context of employer's interviews and interrogatories
are discussed starting infra note 163 with accompanying text.
92. 125 N.L.R.B. 110, 45 L.R.R.M. 1070 (1959).
93. See also Hurley Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 282, 47 L.R.R.M. 1293 (1961) and note
Aragon Mills, 135 N.L.R.B. 859, 49 L.R.R.M. 1669 (1962), where the Board found
that an employer's pre-election notification to its employees that copies of "company
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Where prior to an election an employer interviewed individually
in the basement of his premises, 5 of 110 eligible voters from four
stores of a 16 store chain and questioned them as to their union sympathy and activity, the Board set the election aside.94 In rejecting the
employer's defense that the interviews were too isolated in number
to have any affect on the outcome of the election, the Board said that
it was reasonable to infer that the ramifications of the interviewing
technique extended beyond the employees immediately involved. In
proscribing the place of interview, the Board held that "when individual
employees are taken from their work place and subjected to anti-union
propaganda at the hands of a supervisor in the privacy of a company
office or in an isolated area away from other employees, there is likelihood that outright fear or uneasiness tinged with fear as to the consequences of unionism will be created in the mind of the employee thus
singled out for special attention. 5 Actual proof that the interviewing
had an objectionable effect, the Board held, is not required as the
employer-created fear or unease is inimical to the Board concept of a
free election.
Employer visits to employee's homes for the purpose of union discussion are also prohibited and similarly constitute such interference
requiring the setting aside of an election. In F. N. Calderwood, Inc.,9 6
supervisors made pre-election visits to the homes of 7 or 8 of 37 eligible
employees urging them to reject the union. The Board found such technique on the part of the employer constituted interference with the election process, regardless of the noncoercive character of the remarks.
There does remain, however, one place at which the employer can
conduct a non-coercive interview with individual employees without
running the risk of having the election set aside. In Mall Tool Company97 the Board overruled the Regional Director's finding that an
employer's technique of talking individually to his employees at their
work stations per se justifies setting aside an election. The Board found
a lack of precedent for the Regional Director's ruling and held that
brief non-coercive talks to individual employees at their work stations
was a legitimate method of employer electioneering, in no way calculated to interfere with the employees' freedom of choice.9"
policy" would be available for discussion at its offices, resulted in individual visitation
by a substantial number of employees, was calculated to induce the employees to come
to the various offices for the purpose of being individually propagandized.
94. The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 140 N.L.R.B.
1570 (1962).

133, 51 L.R.R.M.

95. 140 N.L.R.B. at 134.
96. 124 N.L.R.B. 1211, 44 L.R.R.M. 1628 (1959).
97. 112 N.L.R.B. 1313, 36 L.R.R.M. 1190 (1955).
98. See also Montgomery Ward & Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 52, 40 L.R.R.M. 1444 (1957),
where the union objected to the employer's conducting individual talks with employees
at their work stations within twenty-four hours of the election as being a violation of the
Board's Peerless Plywood rule, warranting the setting aside of the election. The
Board rejected this contention stating, "We do not believe that we should extend the
Peerless Plywood rule to the extent urged by the Petitioner." 119 N.L.R.B. at 54.
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THE SUBSTANCE AND CONTENT
OF EMPLOYER SPEECH
The task of evaluating the content of an employer's speech, or
other form of communication, can come before the Board under various
circumstances. First, it can be alleged that the employer's speech or
written communication is violative of section 8(a) (1) of the Act in
that it tends to coerce, restrain, or otherwise interfere with employees
in their right to join a union or engage in other protected activity. The
Board may also be called upon to evaluate an employer's speech or other
communication pursuant to "objections to conduct affecting the result
of an election," with or without the allegation that such speech or communication is an unfair labor practice in violation of section 8(a) (1).
Section 8(c), the "free speech" proviso, protects the expression of
views, argument, or opinion, unless such expression is also a threat of
force or reprisal or promise of benefit in the context of the employees'
section 7 rights. Conversely, if there is no threat of force or reprisal or
promise of benefit, the expression is not violative of section 8(a) (1),
nor is this the type of conduct that dissipates the "free speech" protection.
THREATS OR

REPRISAL

Discharge: Threats of reprisal may take many forms, the most
common of which is a threat of discharge for union activity. In NLRB
v. Lester Bros., Inc.,9" a case typical of many, the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit found such threats and found the Board's decision
"adequately grounded" in that the record revealed a company supervisor told one of the pro-union employees that "a lot of men can lose
their jobs by messing with" the union. In addition, the evidence
revealed that on another occasion a supervisor told an employee "they
done sent a gang of them up the hill on account of it [the Union].
And if they don't mind, they going to send some more.'"0 0
Loss of Employment and Loss of Business: In Haynes Stellite
Co., Division of Union Carbide Corp.,' 01 the Board held that an employer's pre-election statements to the effect that customers would look
elsewhere, seeking other sources of supply if the plant became unionized,
tended to implant in the employees a fear that a loss of jobs would inevitably follow a union victory. The Board found a violation of section
8(a) (1) and set the election aside. However, on appeal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the Board and
found that the section of the employer's speech objected to by the union
as an unlawful threat of loss of employment was a legitimate exercise
99. 301 F.2d 62 (4th Cir. 1962), enforcing 131 N.L.R.B. 1144, 48 L.R.R.M.
1233 (1961).
100. 301 F.2d at 67. See also NLRB v. Baltimore Paint and Chemical Corp., 308
F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1962), enforcing 135 N.L.R.B. 871, 49 L.R.R.M. 1441 (1962). A
most recent case of threat of discharge if union activity continued or if the union was
successful in organizing plant is Big Three Welding Equipment Company, 145
N.L.R.B. 1685, 55 L.R.R.M. 1236 (1964). The cases are collected in L.R.R.M. Cumulative Digest and Index under "Threats and Inducements", No. 50.769, and in 2 CCH
LAB. L. REP. (Labor Relations) "Threats", No. 3770.
101. 136 N.L.R.B. 95, 49 L.R.R.M. 1711 (1962). See 27 Bd. Rep. 85.
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by the employer of its right of free speech guaranteed by the Federal
Constitution and section 8(c) of the Act. °2 Nevertheless, in a case
decided subsequent to the Sixth Circuit's decision, the Board, adhering
to its decision in the original Haynes Stellite Co. case, set aside an
election where the employer in speeches and written communications,
stated that a union victory with possible ensuing strikes might result in
loss of the employer's customers which would mean lost jobs and less
03
job security in the future.1
Prior to Haynes Stellite, the Board set aside elections in the
following situations: where a supervisor told employees that the "company has spent a lot of money and made a lot of improvements . . .
they haven't made any they couldn't move"; 10 where the employer
told an employee that if they voted for the union they would vote for a
strike and if they voted for the company, they would vote for a raise
and where in the same case the employer advertised in a local newspaper for white warehouse help while the great majority of his employees were Negro;1°5 where the employer stated in a speech to his
employees, that if the union were voted in, "there is no doubt in
my mind, because of the terrific demands that they are showing, . ..
there will be a strike . . . [we] will not be able to cope with that
problem; there will be a strike; whether we go out of business or not
I am not saying right now. Use your own judgment";106 where the
employer in a speech to assembled employees stated that since certain
(unnamed) customers have learned that the union had started up its
"agitation" again, the employer has been having difficulty obtaining
contracts and its business has declined and that if he could show his
customers that there would be no interference from the union or other
labor trouble at the plant, he could get more contracts and thereby
better conditions at the plant if the union were defeated ;107 and where
the employer on several occasions stressed the depressed economic
plight of the area and stated to his employees that "We will be forced
to close this factory down," that he had shut down his plant in Pennsylvania because of the union, that "You lose your job - you lose
your pay check," that "if the union calls a strike here we are perfectly
free to close the doors of this factory - and put a padlock on it."' '
However, four more recent cases involving employer election campaigns appear to reflect a more realistic and less theoretical attitude of
the Board toward an employer's rights to inform his employees as to
the economic realities involved in choosing union representation. In
Texas Boot Mfg. Co., Inc., 0 9 the employer read a prepared speech to
102. Union Carbide Corp. v. NLRB, 310 F.2d 844 (6th Cir. 1962).
103. Storkline Corp., 142 N.L.R.B. 875, 53 L.R.R.M. 1160 (1963). See also the
Board's decision setting aside the original election in an earlier case, Storkline Corp.,
135 N.L.R.B. 1146, 49 L.R.R.M. 1666 (1962).
104. Aragon Mills, 135 N.L.R.B. 859, 862, 49 L.R.R.M. 1669 (1962).
105. Associated Grocers of Port Arthur, 134 N.L.R.B. 468, 49 L.R.R.M. 1242 (1961).
106. Somismo, Inc., 133 N.L.R.B. 1310, 1311, 49 L.R.R.M. 1030 (1961).
107. R. D. Cole Mfg. Co., 133 N.L.R.B. 1455, 49 L.R.R.M. 1033 (1961). For full
text of employer's speech, see 133 N.L.R.B. at 1457 (Appendix A).
108. Myrna Mills, Inc., 133 N.L.R.B. 767, 48 L.R.R.M. 1707 (1961). See also
Regional Director's "Report on Objections" setting out in detail evidence presented,
findings of fact, and recommendations to the Board, at 133 N.L.R.B. 1740.
109. 143 N.L.R.B. 264, 53 L.R.R.M. 1306 (1963).
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his employees in which, inter alia, he stated, "I don't believe that we
can do business with the costs the union will demand. The only way
the Union can enforce its demands on Texas Boot Company is by calling you out on a strike to enforce its [sic] unreasonable demands. This
is the history of Unions .... I am not going to close down this factory

one day, because of a strike called by the union. We will continue to
operate and hire new workers."'1 0 The Trial Examiner, apparently
following the Board's lead in Dal-Tex and companion cases' concluded
that the speech constituted a warning to employees that the designation
of the union as bargaining representative would lead inevitably to
strikes and to loss of jobs and hence constituted threats of economic
loss violative of section 8(a) (1) of the Act. In reversing the Trial
Examiner, the Board held that the employer "did no more than tell
employees that if the union made 'unreasonable demands' it would be
necessary for the union to strike to enforce these demands, in which
case the employer could exercise its lawful right permanently to replace
the strikers and then the strikers would have lost their jobs."
In Lord Baltimore Press," 2 the Board, overruling the Regional
Director, held that the employer's speeches contained neither an express
or implied threat to go out of business nor was there any implication
of the inevitability of a strike should the union win. In his speech, the
employer had pointed out that no company could survive, let alone
prosper and grow, if it could not meet or better its competition. The
employer stated that real economic security could only be arrived at by
continuous full employment; that no union or union contract would
provide work for the plant; and that if a union were to succeed in
imposing conditions on an employer which adversely affected its competitive position, it could make it almost impossible for the employer to
get enough sales to provide full and regular employment. He went on to
point out specific instances in which plants organized by the same union
had been forced to go out of business, causing widespread unemployment.
In American Greetings Corp.," 8 the employer waged what the
Board described as an "aggressive" campaign. During the course of
the campaign, fourteen letters were sent to employees," 4 cartoons and
play money lampooning the union and its promises were circulated, and
anti-union posters were displayed. The letters, cartoons, and posters
referred, in the main, to two strikes in which the petitioning union was
involved and to a third strike involving another union.
110. 143 N.L.R.B. at 270.
111. See Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782, 50 L.R.R.M. 1489 and discussion
at p. 47 infra (1962).
112. 145 N.L.R.B. 888, 55 L.R.R.M. 1068 (1964).
113. 146 N.L.R.B. 157, 56 L.R.R.M. 1064 (1964).
114. In the letter of March 19, the employer stated, inter alia, "A union in the,
plant could not possibly benefit any of us, but instead, we strongly believe it would do
serious harm." In the letter of March 22, entitled "Protect Your Freedom," the
employer said: "You have much to lose if the outside union organizers win," i.e.,
"[Y]our freedom as an American citizen" and "your right to decide for yourself what
you want to do." The Letter of April 16, after referring to a six-week strike initiated
by the union at a paper company in Memphis, Tennessee, which resulted in no benefits
and which was called off after strikers were replaced, ended with the query - "Do
you want to lose your job through being replaced in one of Bradshaw's stupid strikes ?"
146 N.L.R.B. 157 (1964).
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In rejecting the union's objections to the employer's campaign,
the majority of the Board noted the following: (a) the statements made
by the employer about the strikes were temperate and factual in character and were relevant to the election issues, (b) to the extent that
the employer's statements arguably were half-truths or created a distorted picture, the union had full opportunity to circulate counterpropaganda, and the union in the instant case did this; and (c) the
employer's statements and cartoons concerning the qualifications of the
union to represent the employees' interests could readily be evaluated
by the employees as typical campaign propaganda." 5
Finally, in Trent Tube Co.," 6 a Board majority held that the
employer did not interfere with the election by stating in pre-election
letters to employees that the union could not guarantee that existing
employee benefits could continue under a union contract, by stating
that "bargaining starts from scratch!" and by emphasizing the possibility of strikes and their adverse effect on employees if the union
were certified.
Finding no basis for concluding that the employees could reasonably construe the employer's statements as constituting threats of
reprisals if the petitioning union won the election, the majority stated:
"The pertinent issues of existing benefits, future benefits,
strikes, union administration, and the requirement of good-faith
bargaining were fully brought to the attention of the employees
by the respective electioneering of the employer and the counterelectioneering of the Petitioner. In our opinion, the Employer's
letter could clearly be evaluated by the employees as partisan
electioneering.""'
In the case of James Lees and Sons Co.,ll& the Board, sustaining
its Regional Director, set aside an election lost by the union on the
ground that "an atmosphere of fear" that the plant would close if
unionized was created by newspaper editorials, letters and advertisements in the local papers, remarks of city officials to employees, and
115. See also Shure Bros., Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. No. 10, 56 L.R.R.M. 1132 (1964),
where a Board majority held that since the employer's remarks in letters and a speech
emphasizing the union's strike record were not accompanied by any statements which
reasonably could have led the employees to believe that it would be futile to select
the union as their bargaining representative, that its conduct was not such as warrants
the setting aside of the election.
116. 147 N.L.R.B. 60, 56 L.R.R.M. 1251 (1964).
117. 56 L.R.R.M. at 1252. See also Elgin Butler Brick Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 170,
56 L.R.R.M. 1439 (1964); Freeman Mfg. Co., 148 N.L.R.B. 68, 57 L.R.R.M. 1047
(1964).
118. 130 N.L.R.B. 290, 47 L.R.R.M. 1285 (1961). That elections can be set aside
on the basis of actions of third parties, even though such actions do not emanate from
the employer, is not a new doctrine. It was first pronounced by the Board in Gwaltney,
Jr. & Co., 74 N.L.R.B. 371, 20 L.R.R.M. 1172 (1947) and has since been affirmed in
The Fallmouth Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 896, 37 L.R.R.M. 1057 (1955) and in Utica-Herbrand
Tool Div., 145 N.L.R.B. 1717, 55 L.R.R.M. 1223 (1964). The cases are collected
at vol. 2 CCH LAB. L. REP. (Labor Relations) No. 2795. While such conduct as
described in these cases warranted the setting aside of the election upon the filing of
timely objections, such conduct cannot serve as grounds for an 8(a) (1) finding against
the employer in the absence of clear evidence that the employer was responsible
therefore.
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anti-union rumors in the community, all stating that the plant would
close if the union won the election. The majority held that it was
immaterial, under the circumstances, that the employer was not responsible for the activities which created the "atmosphere" and implied
that even so, the employer had an obligation to disavow the activities
of the townspeople or risk having the election invalidated. The Board
set aside the election.
In Claymore Mfg. Co.,"' an employer's written and oral disavowals of community rumors to the effect that the plant would close
down if the union won the election were deemed a sufficient antidote
to take the case out of the purview of the James Lees doctrine. In
Claymore the Board majority pointed out that the employer issued a
letter to employees disavowing the rumors, that the disavowal was
issued at the union's request, and that there was no showing that the
union was dissatisfied with the disavowal at the time it was uttered.
The majority further noted that all of the statements were made at a
time when the employer was losing money and that the employer's
letter contained a "straight-forward" statement that the employer had
dealt fairly with the employees, hoped to do better by them, and intended
to keep the plant operating regardless of the outcome of the election.

PROMISE OF BENEFITS

The Supreme Court in NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 120 resolved
a conflict which had existed among several Courts of Appeals concerning the limitations which section 8(a) (1) of the Act places on the
right of an employer to confer economic benefits on his employees
shortly before a representation election. The Board had originally
found that the announcement of a birthday holiday and the announcement and grant of overtime and vacation benefits just before the election
were arranged by the employer with the intention of inducing the
employees to vote against the union.'' However, the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit denied enforcement of the Board's order, noting
that "the benefits were put into effect unconditionally on a permanent
basis, and no one has suggested that there was any implication 'the
benefits would be withdrawn if the workers voted for the union. "122
119. 146 N.L.R.B. 153, 56 L.R.R.M. 1080 (1964).

120. 375 U.S. 405 (1964).

121. 131 N.L.R.B. 806, 48 L.R.R.M. 1147 (1961). Previously, it had been the
Board's rule, in objections to elections cases, to consider only that conduct which
occurred in the short period between the date of direction of an election by the Board
(or the date the parties agreed upon an election) and the date of the election itself,
in deciding whether the election should be set aside. The Board there took the position
that any conduct which occurred before such a time was too remote to have substantial effect upon the election. However, in Ideal Elec. & Mfg. Co., 134 N.L.R.B.
1275, 49 L.R.R.M. 1316 (1961), the Board changed its policy and stated it would
consider all conduct occurring from the date of the filing of the election petition until
the date of the actual election in deciding whether the results should be overturned.
122. 304 F.2d 368, 375 (5th Cir. 1962). Other courts have found a violation of
section 8(a) (1) in cases involving similar conduct. See, e.g., Indiana Metal Products
Corp. v. NLRB, 202 F.2d 613 (7th Cir. 1953); NLRB v. Pyne Molding Corp., 226

F.2d 818 (2d Cir. 1955).
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In reversing the lower court, a unanimous Supreme Court held:
"The danger inherent in well-timed increases in benefits is the
suggestion of a fist inside the velvet glove. Employees are not
likely to miss the inference that the source of benefits now conferred is also the source from which future benefits must flow
and which may dry up if it is not obliged. The danger may be
diminished if, as in this case, the benefits are conferred permanently and unconditionally. But the absence of conditions or
threats pertaining to the particular benefits conferred would be of
controlling significance only if it could be presumed that no question of additional benefits or renegotiation of existing benefits
would arise2 3in the future; and, of course, no such presumption
is tenable.'1
The Supreme Court's decision, however, does not appear to go
so far as to, prohibit any and all forms of increases or benefits announced or granted between the filing of an election petition and the
date of election. It is submitted that the rule as first announced in
United Screw and Bolt Corp.124 and restated in International Shoe
Co.125 will still be applied, in conformity, of course, with the language
of the Court in Exchange Parts. The Board in International Shoe
held that:
"[T]he granting of employee benefits during the period immediately preceding an election is not per se ground for setting
aside an election. However, in the absence of a showing that the
timing of the announcement was governed by factors other than
the pendency of the election, the Board has set aside elections on
the grounds that the granting of benefits at that particular time
was calculated to influence the employees in their choice of a
bargaining representative. The
burden of showing these other
1 26
factors is upon the Employer.'
In applying this rule to the instant case, the Board could find no reason
why, if the sole purpose of the announcement was to inform the employees of the proposed wage increase, the employer, rather than posting the notice of the proposed increase one day before the election, did
not delay it at least until after the election or until it was finally
2
approved. The election was set aside and a new election granted.' 7
123. 375 U.S. at 409.
124. 91 N.L.R.B. 916, 26 L.R.R.M. 1596 (1950).
125. 123 N.L.R.B. 682, 43 L.R.R.M. 1520 (1959).
126. 123 N.L.R.B. at 684.
127. See also United Screw & Bolt Corp., 91 N.L.R.B. at 919, 26 L.R.R.M. 1596
(1950), where the Board in refusing to set aside an election on union objections found
that :
"the announcement of the wage increases and insurance benefits to the Chicago
employees followed almost immediately after the formal conclusion of collectivebargaining negotiations at the Cleveland plant, at a time when it had been customary
to grant such benefits, and when the Chicago employees could, on the basis of past
practice, have reasonably expected that adjustments in terms of conditions of their
employment would be made."
Typical of Board cases in the area of "promise of benefits" are the following in
which an 8(a) (1) violation was found: Cincinnati Cordage & Paper Co., 141 N.L.R.B.
72, 52 L.R.R.M. 1277 (1963) (promise of a wage increase) ; Rocky Mountain Natural
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"PREDICTIONS

'AND' PROPHECIES"

From approximately 1953 to 1962, the decisions causing the
greatest amount of indignation and adverse criticism were those in
which the NLRB attempted to distinguish between illegal "threats"
or "promises" on the one hand, and privileged "predictions" or
"prophecies" or "expressions of legal position" on the other. 2 ' While
the distinction appears to have been formulated in the final years of
the Wagner Act, 2 ' it lay mostly dormant until the decision in Chicopee
Mfg. Co. (1953),130 in which the Board stated:
"The Hearing officer found (1) that Plant Engineer Halloway told employee Wagner, on May 1, 1953, that the Chicopee
Manufacturing Company could not pay the same wage scales as
the . . . [union] had obtained at Personal Products Company,
also a subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson Corporation, and that 'if
the union won, they would be forced to move the plant,' and (2)
that Shift Foreman Oliveiria, in conversations with employee
Baker, stated that the Employer 'could move the plant if they so
desired'.

.

.

. We view these statements, under the circum-

stances, as nothing more than predictions of the possible impact of
wage demands upon the Employer's business. A prophecy that
unionization might ultimately lead to loss of employment is not
coercive where there is no threat that the Employer will use its
economic power to make its prophecy come true."''
The more recent decisions of the Board, however, appear to mark
a trend away from the privileged "prediction" doctrine. In Somismo,
Inc.,"s2 the Regional Director in overruling union objections to the
election, held that the speech in question was a mere prediction of the
Gas Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 1191, 52 L.R.R.M. 1206 (1963) (promise of paid vacation);
Marsh Supermarkets, Inc., 140 N.L.R.B. 899, 52 L.R.R.M. 1134 (1963) (promise of
nights off); Reserve Supply Corp. of Long Island, Inc., 140 N.L.R.B. 330, 52
L.R.R.M. 1012 (1962) (more overtime work); Han Dee Spring and Mfg. Co., 132
N.L.R.B. 1542, 48 L.R.R.M. 1565 (1961)
(promise of insurance benefits); Savoy
Leather Mfg. Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 425, 51 L.R.R.M. 1348 (1962) (offer to install
hospitalization plan) ; NLRB v. Howard-Copper Corp., 259 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1958)
(coffee breaks) ; NLRB v. Radcliffe, 211 F. 2d 309 (9th Cir. 1954) (promise to
grant pension plans or profit-sharing plans).
128. See Koretz, Employer Interference With Union OrganizationVersus Employer
Free Speech, 29 Gao. WASH. L. Rev. 399, 413 (1960); Committee for Economic
Development, THE PUBLIC INTER" ST IN NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 79-80 (1961);
Aaron, Employer Free Speech: The Search For a Policy, in PUBLIC POLICIgS AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

49 (Aaron, Schister and Summers ed. 1962), where Professor

Aaron states "even after making allowance, some of the distinctions [between illegal
threat and privileged prediction] drawn by the Board approach the metaphysical."
129. Electric Steel Foundry, 74 N.L.R.B. 129, 20 L.R.R.M. 1137 (1947).
130. 107 N.L.R.B. 106, 33 L.R.R.M. 1064 (1953).
131. 107 N.L.R.B. at 107. Accord, Supplee-Biddle-Steltz Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 458,
38 L.R.R.M. 1288 (1956) ; Syracuse Color Press, Inc., 103 N.L.R.B. 377, 378, 31
L.R.R.M. 1473 (1953) (holding that the employer was not guilty of an unfair labor
practice when the statement complained of "was merely a prediction of economic
consequences beyond [employer's] control"), enforced 209 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1954);
Super Sagless Spring Corp., 125 N.L.R.B. 1214, 45 L.R.R.M. 1247 (1959) ; NashFinch Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 808, 39 L.R.R.M. 1329 (1957) ; NLRB v. Transport Clearings,
Inc., 311 F.2d 519, 523-24 (5th Cir. 1962).
132. 133 N.L.R.B. 1310, 49 L.R.R.M. 1030 (1961).
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dire consequences which would result from a union's policies, or
demands, rather than from the employer's actions, and was, therefore,
privileged. The Board did not agree. It found the employer's remarks
conveyed to employees the threat that it would go out of business if it had
to deal with the union and that such conduct interfered with the employees' freedom of choice, warranting the ordering of a second election.
Also of interest, along this line, is Haynes Stellite Co., 132a where
the employer, in the course of several prepared speeches, read the
following statement to his employees prior to the election:
"Customers are buying products on the basis of prices, delivery,
and dependability. The facts are that in some cases we are the
sole source of supply at present for some of our customers. We
have been told that we would not continue to be the sole source
of supply if we become unionized, due to the ever present possibility
of a work stoppage due to strikes or walkouts. ' 132b
The Board, in finding an 8(a)(1) violation, held that the employer made constant reference to the withdrawal of orders for the
purpose of implanting in the employees
a fear that a loss of jobs would
1 33
inevitably follow a union victory.
STATEMENT

OF LEGAL POSITION

Board policy in the area of employer statements couched in terms
of legal position had been for the most part inconsistent. In a number
of cases involving objections to election, the Board had held statements to the effect that the employer would not bargain with the union
to be merely privileged expressions of the employer's "legal position,"
protected by section 8(c) of the Act.1 4 On the other hand, the Board
had long held in unfair labor practice proceedings that such statements
132a. 136 N.L.R.B. 95,49 L.R.R.M. 1711 (1962), rev'd, 310 F.2d 844 (6th Cir. 1962).
132b. 136 N.L.R.B. at 96-97.
133. Member Leedom stated in his dissent, "This statement was not made in the
context of any contemporaneous interference with employees' rights; it contained no
threat that the employees would lose anything by reason of any action which
Respondent (Employer) might take. It merely informed the employees of what others
might do if the employees selected the Union." The Trial Examiner had found that
in fact one customer, for whom the Employer was the sole source of supply, had told
the Employer's Vice-President that if the plants became unionized, the customer would
have to look elsewhere for another source of supply. Member Leedom's position
appears all the more reasonable when one examines the decision in Nebraska Bag
Co., 122 N.L.R.B. 654, 43 L.R.R.M. 1172 (1958), in which he is in agreement with
the Board finding that a statement similar to the one at issue in Haynes Stellite was
made in the context of other substantial interference, including a prior threat that
the Employer would change its method of operation. Similarly, see A. J. Showalter
Co., 64 N.L.R.B. 573, 17 L.R.R.M. 121 (1945), where the statement was accompanied
by a threat that the Employer would close its operation.
134. Typical of such cases is Esquire, Inc., 107 N.L.R.B. 1238, 33 L.R.R.M. 1367
(1953), where the employer in a letter to his employees stated that he believed the
unit determination made by the Board was contrary to the Act and that the only
means through which the employer could obtain redress, if the union won the election,
would be by refusing to bargain. The letter also stated that a year or two would be
required before the courts could review a Board order to bargain. See also National
Furniture Mfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 1300, 33 L.R.R.M. 1004 (1953). Compare Alama
Express, Inc., 127 N.L.R.B. 89, 45 L.R.R.M. 1499 (1960), finding that a similar statement, inter alia, interfered with the election.
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were not within the "free speech" protection of section 8(c) of the
Act but, rather, constituted interference, restraint and coercion of employees within the meaning of section 8(a) (1).131
In the recent case of Dal-Tex Optical Co.,136 new Board policy in
regard to employer statements of legal position was established. The
Board overruling National Furniture Company, Inc., 1 37 and Esquire,
Inc.,1 3 warned that an election may be set aside where an employer
in the guise of stating his legal rights, tells his employees that he will
not bargain with the union even if it wins the election.
In Dal-Tex the employer informed his employees that in the event
the union won the election, it would not mean a thing because the
''courts are still going to have to determine" the issue and "my guess
is that it will be another couple of years before this matter is settled."
He further stated that he did not have to and would not change his
wage policy and that "if required to bargain and unable to agree, there
is no power on earth that could make [me] sign a contract."' 139
The Board set the election aside on the ground the employer's
statements were couched in language intending to convey to the employees the danger and futility of their designating the union. In finding
that such statements conveyed to employees the probability that they
would suffer economic loss and reprisal if they selected the union,
the Board stated:
"While these comments may appear to be mere statements of
the Employer's legal rights and his intention to adhere to them,
in the present context they assume quite a different character . . .
the entire import and impact of [the above listed statements] was
changed to a clear message that the Employer would not sign a
contract even if required to negotiate. .

.

. [T]he Employer's

position that it would not change its wage policy, undeniably [was]
14
...a predetermination not to bargain on the subject of wages."Y 0
The Board had occasion to apply the rationale of Dal-Tex in the
case of Lord Baltimore Press.'4 ' There, the employer in a pre-election
letter to employees stated (1) the employer might be forced out of
135. See, e.g., Grundwald-Marx, Inc., 127 N.L.R.B. 476, 46 L.R.R.M. 1035 (1960),
enforcement denied on other grounds, 290 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1961) ; NLRB v. Marden
Mfg. Co., 217 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1954), enforced as modified, 106 N.L.R.B. 1335,
33 L.R.R.M. 1025 (1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 981 (1955) ; Reliance Mfg. Co., 28
N.L.R.B. 1051, 7 L.R.R.M. 165 (1941), enforced, 125 F.2d 311, 314 (7th Cir. 1941).
136. 137 N.L.R.B. 1782, 50 L.R.R.M. 1489 (1962). The decision in Dal-Tex is of
further significance in that it specifically overrules prior Board decisions to the extent
that they suggest that section 8(c) is applicable to pre-election statements. That provision, the Board stated, is limited to unfair labor practice cases, and it has no
application to representation cases. The Board added,
"Conduct violative of Section 8(a) (1) is, a fortiori, conduct which interferes with
the exercise of a free and untrammeled choice in an election. This is so because the
test of conduct which may interfere with the 'laboratory conditions' for an election is
considerably more restrictive than the test of conduct which amounts to interference,
restraint, or coercion which violates section 8(a) (1)." at 1787.
137. 106 N.L.R.B. 1300, 33 L.R.R.M. 1004 (1953).
138. Ibid.
139. 137 N.L.R.B. at 1786.
140. Ibid.
141. 142 N.L.R.B. 328. 53 L.R.R.M. 1019 (1963).

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXV

business, thus eliminating jobs, (2) the union's demands would be so
unreasonable that the union would have to call a strike, and (3) the
employer would not bargain with the union because he considered the
unit to be inappropriate and intended to challenge the Board's unit
finding in court.
In regard to the employer's statement of legal position, the
Board stated:
"[W]e can only view this kind of statement of legal position as a
threat to use the delaying process of the law to the fullest extent
possible in order to thwart the policies of the Act we enforce.
Such conduct, combined with the fear of economic loss that must
flow from the Employer's predictions of its reaction to the Petitioner's unknown demands must be held to have destroyed the
laboratory conditions we seek to maintain and, consequently, to
have prevented the employees' free choice."' 42
143
The election was set aside and a second election was directed.
Recently, however, the Board had occasion to distinguish both
Dal-Tex and Lord Baltimore. In W. T. Grant Co.,'" the union, in
its objections to the election, alleged that a notice posted by the employer
for several weeks prior to the election contained a threat not to bargain
with the union in the event it won the election. In overruling the union's
objections, the Board stated:

"In the circumstances of the case, we believe that the posted
Notice was no more than an expression of the employer's disagreement with the Board's action in setting aside the first election and
of its determination to test the validity of the action in the only
way open to it, through an 8(a) (5) proceeding. We are unable
to conclude the knowledge of the employer's position in this regard, without more, would justify the conclusion that employees
were thereby inhibited in the exercise of their freedom of choice
in the election. This case is factually distinguishable from the
Dal-Tex and Lord Baltimore cases, in each of which the employer's statement of legal position, read in the context of its
other objectionable campaign statements, was construed by the
Board to mean that it would in no event bargain collectively
and
1' 45
that selection of a representative would be a futile act.'

RACIAL APPEALS

Prior to its precedent-setting decision in Sewell Mfg. Co.,

46

the

NLRB taking the position that, although it did not condone appeals
142. 142 N.LR.B. at 329.
143. See Lord Baltimore Press, 145 N.L.R.B. 888, 55 L.R.R.M. 1068 (1964).
144. 147 N.L.R.B. No. 52, 56 L.R.R.M. 1231 (1964).
145. 56 L.R.R.M. at 1232.
146. 138 N.L.R.B. 66, 50 L.R.R.M. 1532 (1962); 140 N.L.R.B. 220, 51 L.R.R.M.
1611 (1962) (second election).
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to racial prejudice, such appeals would not warrant setting an election aside if the statements
involved no misrepresentation, fraud,
4
violence, or coercion. 7
However, in Sewell and Allen Morrison Sign Co., 48 which were
decided simultaneously in 1962, the Board established that it would
thereafter apply the following tests in ruling on issues involving racial
appeals made to voters in the course of election campaigns. In determining whether a racial appeal made to voters warrants invalidating
an election, the Board will determine: (1) Whether the party making
the racial appeals has limited itself to setting forth truthfully the other
party's position on matters of racial interest and does not deliberately
seek to overstress and exacerbate racial feelings by irrelevant, inflammatory appeals. Elections will not be set aside on the basis of truthful,
germane statements on racial matters; (2) The burden will be on the
party making use of a racial appeal to establish that it was truthful
and germane. Where there is doubt as to whether the total conduct
of the party uttering racial statements is within permissible limits,
such doubt will be resolved against that party.'4 9
In Sewell the employer, two weeks before the election, sent his
employees a large photograph showing a close-up of an unidentified
Negro man dancing with an unidentified white woman. Underneath
was a caption in large, bold letters reading: "The CIO strongly pushes
and endorses the FEPC." On the same day, the employer also sent
his employees a reproduction of a newspaper picture showing a white
man dancing with a Negro lady. The caption beneath this picture read:
"UNION LEADER JAMES B. CAREY DANCES WITH A LADY FRIEND He is president of the IUE which seeks to unionize Vickers Plant here."
Other printed and pictorial material sent to employees sought to
identify the union with "race-mixing," "freedom-riders," and organizations promoting integration.
In finding that the company's campaign propaganda was calculated
"to exacerbate racial prejudice and to create an emotional atmosphere
of hostility" toward the union, the Board stated:
"[A]ppeals to racial prejudice on matters unrelated to the election issues or to the union's activities are not mere 'prattle' or
puffing. They have no place in Board electoral campaigns. They
inject an element which is destructive of the very purpose of an
election. They create conditions which make impossible a sober
informed exercise of the franchise. The Board does not intend to
tolerate as 'electoral propaganda' appeals or arguments which can
have no purpose except to inflame the racial feelings of voters
in the election."' 150

147. See Sharnay Hosiery Mills, Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. 750, 42 L.R.R.M. 1036 (1958);
Chock Full O'Nuts, 120 N.L.R.B. 1296, 42 L.R.R.M. 1152 (1958); Paula Shoe Co.,
121 N.L.R.B. 673, 42 L.R.R.M. 1419 (1958).
148. 138 N.L.R.B. 73, 50 L.R.R.M. 1535 (1962).
149. Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66, 71-72 (1962).
150. 138 N.L.R.B. at 71. In its opinion the Board distinguishes the Paula Shoe and
Sharnay cases, supra note 147, as well as Allen-Morrison Sign Co., supra note 148,
decided the same day as Sewell.
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In Allen Morrison Sign Co.,' decided the same day as Sewell,
the employer, about one week before the election, had mailed to its
employees a letter informing them of the petitioning union's position on
integration, the position taken by the old CIO (of which petitioning
union was a member), and of contributions by the AFL-CIO to the
NAACP. This was followed by a second letter to which was attached
a newspaper article describing disciplinary action taken by the union
against one of its locals that favored segregation.
Although conceding that the challenged statements catered to
racial prejudice, a Board majority stated that they were factually correct, were concerned with something the employees were entitled to
know about, and were moderate in tone. It was therefore held that
the statements did not amount to such intereference as would warrant setting the election aside.' 52

MISREPRESENTATIONS

Another factor which may disturb the so-called "laboratory conditions" established by the Board so as to insure employees full and
complete freedom of choice in selecting or rejecting a bargaining
representative is a gross misrepresentation concerning some material
issue involved in the election.
Several years ago, the National Right-to-Work Committee produced a twenty-two minute movie entitled "And Women Must Weep."
The film itself was professionally scripted and acted and purported
to be a true account of the 1956 Potter-Brumfield strike in Princeton,
Indiana. It tells a story of property destruction, violence, and the near
murder of a child which allegedly occurred during a strike supposedly
called for no justifiable reason.
13
In Plochman & Harrison-Cherry Lane Foods, Inc., ' the employer showed the film to his assembled employees on the day before
the election. The union lost and filed objections. As stated by the
151. 138 N.L.R.B. 73, 50 L.R.R.M. 1535 (1962).
152. See Pollitt, The National Labor Relations Board And Race Hate Propaganda
In Union Organization Drives, 17 STAN. L. Rzv. 373 (1965) ; Sovern, The National
Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination,62 COLUM. L. REv. 563 (1962) ; and
Comment, Free Choice and Some Problems of Race and Remedies in Representation
Campaigns, 72 YALE L.J. 1243 (1963).
In its most recent pronouncement in the area of "racial appeals," the Board held
that pre-election literature distributed by a union and a local Interdenominational
Ministerial Alliance in a campaign to organize employees who were predominantly
Negro, did not warrant setting the election aside. The Board adopted this finding
even though it acknowledged that the campaign involved a racial issue. The Board
also found that, although some of the language in the literature had emotional overtones and was not to be condoned, it was not designed to inflame racial hatred, but,
instead, to encourage racial pride. The Board distinguished the literature in the instant
case from that used in Sewell, which was designed, the Board said, to inflame racial
hatred and to engender a conflict between Negro and white workers. See Archer
Laundry Co., 150 N.L.R.B. No. 139, 58 L.R.R.M. 1212 (1965) ; Aristocrat Linen Supply
Co., 150 N.L.R.B. No. 140, 58 L.R.R.M. 1216 (1965).
153. 140 N.L.R.B. 130, 51 L.R.R.M. 1558 (1962). See also Carl T. Mason Co.,
142 N.L.R.B. 480, 53 L.R.R.M. 1063 (1963), where the Board employed the total
context principle. See also Ideal Baking Co., 143 N.L.R.B. 546, 53 L.R.R.M. 1270
(1963).
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majority, "the issue before the Board is whether this type of campaign propaganda is a legitimate exercise of the employer's right
to free speech or an interference with the employees' right to select
a union ....""'
The Regional Director had dismissed the union's objections and
had certified the results of the election. In overruling the Regional
Director's decision, the majority noted that the conduct in the case
before it was "a new and somewhat different type of electioneering. ....
"
After emphasizing the professional character of the film, the majority
concluded:
"[W]e are satisfied that the Employer effectively tarred the
Petitioner with the alleged reprehensible conduct of the Princeton union. In our opinion, the impact of this film upon the
average viewer, who could reasonably accept the characters and
events as true, was in the nature of misrepresentation which exceeded the bounds of permissible campaign propaganda and an
interference with the election of the following day."' 5
In deciding cases based upon alleged misrepresentations, the Board is
faced with the delicate duty of balancing the right of the employees to
an untrammeled choice, and the right of the parties to wage a free and
vigorous campaign. The latest restatement of the test used by the Board
in attempting to strike this balance was set out in Hollywood Ceramics
Co., Inc.,'5 6 as follows:
"We believe that an election should be set aside only where
there has been a misrepresentation or other similar campaign
trickery, which involves a substantial departure from the truth, at
a time which prevents the other party or parties from making an
effective reply so that the misrepresentation, whether deliberate
or not, may reasonably be expected to have a significant impact on
the election. However, the mere fact that a message is inartistically
or vaguely worded and subject to different interpretations will not
suffice to establish 1such
misrepresentation as would lead us to set
57
the election aside.'
In Steel Equipment Co.," 8 the Board, relying on Holl3wood
Ceramics, set aside the election where statements in an employer's preelection leaflet concerning wage rates and job classifications assertedly
negotiated by a union at a subcontractor's plant, were held to be material
misrepresentations since the subcontractor had two plants, one of which
was non-union, and the employer failed to identify the plant to which
he referred. In addition, the Board held that the employer conveyed
the impression that the stated rates, which were those at a non-union
plant and lower than those at a unionized plant, and lower than his own,
were the result of a collective bargaining contract.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

140
140
140
140
140

N.L.R.B.
N.L.R.B.
N.L.R.B.
N.L.R.B.
N.L.R.B.

at 132.
at 133.
221, 51 L.R.R.M. 1600 (1963).
at 224.
1158, 52 L.R.R.M. 1192 (1963).
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In U.S. Gypsum Co.," 9 an employer's use of telegrams sent by a
manager of a plant whose employees were represented by the petitioning
union, indicating that the "International Boss" of the union had refused
to consult with employees during negotiations and had "prevented wage
increases there for 19 months," were found by a Board majority to
be deliberately misleading statements within the special knowledge of
the employer, warranting the setting aside of the election. It was
further found that the distribution and posting of the telegrams two
days before the election gave the union insufficient time to learn of and
point out the misstatements.
If a party to an election considers his opponent's propaganda to
be a material misrepresentation, that party is obligated to utilize whatever opportunity exists to offer a rebuttal, or run the risk of being held
to have waived the right to object. This is illustrated by the Board's
decision in Motec Industries,6 ' where the union's objection to the
election was overruled on the ground that the union had sufficient
opportunity to, and did, respond to the employer's assertions by distributing two letters to the employees refuting the assertions.
In The Trane Co., 6 ' two members of the Board found a material
misrepresentation in an employer's note placed in pay envelopes on
election day. The note stated that the union would want an "estimated"
five dollars per month in dues, not including other charges "you may
be forced to pay." The Board reasoned that this constituted a material
misrepresentation, as the dues were actually four dollars per month, and
the State's "right-to-work" law insured that no one could be required
to join the union in order to retain his job. The Board also found
that the employees were in no position to correctly evaluate the employer's misstatements, and in view of their form and timing, the
election had to be set aside.
EMPLOYEE

INTERVIEWS

AND

INTERROGATION

Interrogation involves speech, but it is not usually employed as a
means of expressing an opinion. Rather, it is a process of gathering
information. Therefore, the employer's right to freely state his viewas,
arguments, and opinions does not apply to interrogation of employees
concerning union activities or attitudes, and the protection afforded by
section 8(c) of the Act does not apply in such cases. As stated by the
Board, section 8(c) affords no protection, for its "purpose... is to permit an employer to express his views, not to license him to extract those
of his employees."'16 2 The section of the Act involved in interrogation
159. 130 N.L.R.B. 901, 47 L.R.R.M. 1436 (1961).
160. 136 N.L.R.B. 711, 49 L.R.R.M. 1828 (1962).
161. 137 N.L.R.B. 1506, 50 L.R.R.M. 1434 (1962).
162. Standard-Coosa-Thatcher, 85 N.L.R.B. 1358, 1363, 24 L.R.R.M. 15V5 (1949).
Several circuit courts disagreed with the Board's view as to the application of sec. 8(c)
to cases involving alleged interrogation. See, e.g., NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,
192 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1951), where the court, in reversing the Board's finding of
unlawful interrogation in violation of section 8(a) (1) stated, "inquiries made by
the manager concerning what was being done in behalf of the union . . . to the extent
that they constituted no threat or intimidation . . . were not unlawful, particularly
after the 1947 amendment of the Act found in section 8(c). . . ." See also NLRB v.
Rockwell Mfg. Co., (Dubois Div.), 271 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1959).
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cases is section 8(a) ( 1) and the factual question to be determined by the
Board is whether the questioning interferes with, restrains, or coerces
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by section 7.1"'
In the Standard-Coosa-Thatcher case,' 64 the Board established
the rule that interrogation of employees as to their union feelings was
per se unlawful, observing that "the subtle pressure created by interrogation results from the realization by the interrogated employee that
his employer is concerned with his union affiliation or activities and
will, therefore, act to the employees' detriment."' 66 The Board's
rationale was based on two main grounds: (1) the right of privacy,
inherent in the rights protected by section 7; and (2) interrogation
about union activity, like open surveillance of union meetings tended to
restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights.' 66
By 1954, however, the combination of court decisions adverse to
Standard-Coosa-Thatcher plus the ascendancy to the majority of
Republican appointees on the Board willing to yield to two courts
brought about a repudiation of the per se doctrine. 6 In the leading
case of Blue Flash Express, 6 " the Board held that interrogation of
employees by an employer as to their union membership and activities
was not per se unlawful, the test being whether, under all the circumstances, interrogation reasonably tends to restrain or interfere with
employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by the Act. The Board
majority found that the interrogation, though systematic, was lawful
because it was conducted for the legitimate purpose of verifying the
union's majority claim. The employees interviewed were so advised,
assurances were given against economic reprisal, and the questioning
occurred in a background free of employer hostility to union organization. The Board cautioned, however, that this decision did not license
employers to interrogate their employees as to union affiliation or activity. As for the test to be applied in future cases, the Board adopted the
rule laid down by the Second Circuit in Syracuse Color Press,'69 that
"[T]he time, the place, the personnel involved, the information sought,
and the employer's conceded preference, all must be considered in determining whether or not the actual or likely effect of the interrogations
upon the employees constitutes interference, restraint or coercion. ' 170
163. See 28 NLRB ANN. Rnp. 65 (1963) and the many cases cited at 27 NLRB
RzP. 91-93 (1962).
164. Supra note 162.
165. Supra note 162, at 1363.
166. Wollett & Rowen, Employer Speech and Related Issues, 16 OHIO ST. L.J. 380,
395-99 (1955).
167. See, e.g., NLRB v. Covington Motor Co., 58 L.R.R.M. 2811 (4th Cir. 1965);
Wayside Press, Inc. v. NLRB, 206 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1953) ; Atlas Life Ins. Co. v.
NLRB, 195 F.2d 136 (10th Cir. 1952). See also Sax v. NLRB, 171 F.2d 769,
772 (7th Cir. 1948), where the court said in regard to the questioning of employees:
"Mere words of interrogation or perfunctory remarks not threatening or intimidating in themselves made by an employer with no anti-union background and
not associated as a part of a pattern or course of conduct hostile to unionism
or as part of espionage upon employees cannot, standing naked and alone, support
a finding of a violation of section 8(1)."
Accord, NLRB v. Winer, Inc., 194 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1952).
168. 109 N.L.R.B. 591, 34 L.R.R.M. 1384 (1954).
169. NLRB v. Syracuse Color Press, Inc., 209 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1954).
170. 209 F.2d at 599.
ANN.
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Widespread interrogation of employees in E-Town Sportswear
Corp.'7' was held violative of section 8(a) (1 ) and, therefore, grounds
for setting aside the election. Examples of the illegal interrogation
found are: (1) a floorlady's inquiry of an employee as to whether another worker was "union"; (2) the manager's inquiry of one employee
concerning the progress of the union; (3) a supervisor's inquiry of one
employee as to whether she was interested in the union; (4) a supervisor's questioning of an employee as to how the election would go,
and if the union would get in; and (5) the manager's inquiry of an
employee concerning what she thought about the union.
Other forms of questioning may be lawful. Where the information sought is to aid in preparation of a defense to an unfair labor
practice charge, the employer may question his employees provided
the questions are relevant to the issues involved and are designed to
produce probative evidence. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
recently ruled on this point. In NLRB v. Guild Industries Manufacturing Corp." 2 the employer's attorney, in preparation for a pending
unfair labor practice case, first orally examined twelve employees under
oath and before a court reporter. Not long thereafter, a team of attorneys conducted what the court termed a "massive" proceeding, taking
place over a period of five days in which every employee at the plant
was questioned. 7 ' Lengthy questionnaires were also given to employees to be filled out. The court found the questioning to have
occurred in the context of anti-union animus by the employer, marked
in part by the posting of a notice announcing the employer's intent to
use "every legal means" to keep the union out.
In recognizing that the line between proper preparation of a
defense in an unfair labor practice proceeding and conduct prohibited
by the Act was fine indeed, the court stated:
"[A]n employer may question his employees in preparation for
a hearing but is restricted to questions relevant to the charges of
unfair labor practice and of sufficient probative value to justify
the risk of intimidation which interrogation as to union matters
necessarily entails; and that even such questions may not be asked
where there is purposeful intimidation of employees. Such a
standard assumes that interrogation of employees concerning their
union activities is, of itself, coercive, but that fairness to the embe perployer requires that a limited amount of such questioning
1 74
mitted despite the possible restraint which may result."Y
171. 141 N.L.R.B. 480, 52 L.R.R.M. 1365 (1963). The cases are collected in
2 CCH LAB. L. REP. 3740; CUMULATIVE DIGEST AND INDEX L.R.R.M. at § 50.240
et seq. & § 62.5599.
172. 321 F.2d 108 (5th Cir. 1963), enforcing 135 N.L.R.B. 93, 49 L.R.R.M. 1101
(1963).
173. 321 F.2d at 113. See NLRB v. Lindsay Newspapers, Inc., 315 F.2d 709 (5th
Cir. 1963). See also Fire Door Corp., 291 F.2d 328, 331 (2d Cir. 1961), enforcing
127 N.L.R.B. 1123, 46 L.R.R.M. 1179 (1960). The court adopted the rule previously
stated in Joy Silk Mills v. NLRB, 185 F.2d 732, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
174. NLRB v. Guild Industries Mfg. Corp., 321 F.2d 108, 113, enforcing 135
N.L.R.B. 93, 49 L.R.R.M. 1101 (1963).
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Finding the interrogation to be coercive, the Fifth Circuit upheld the
Board's finding of 8(a) (1) violation.
Several other rather recent courts of appeals decisions on the subject of employee interrogation deserve comment. In S. H. Kress &
Company v. NLRB,'7 5 the Ninth Circuit posed the test to be applied
in such cases as being "whether the purpose (legitimate or not in the
eyes of the Board) would appear to the employees to constitute reasonable grounds for an interrogation." If so, the court answered "...
the fact of interrogation in and of itself would carry no sinister implication to the employees.'- 7 6 In the Kress case, the Board17 7 found that
the employer, after a representation petition had been filed, systematically interrogated a majority of his employees as to whether they had
signed union cards. This was done only after a number of employees
had voluntarily informed the employer of their doubts as to the
adequacy of the union's showing of interest in support of its petition.
The Board, in distinguishing Blue Flash Express,17 found that such
interrogations served no permissible function and interfered with the
employees rights to privacy in their union affairs, as well as an interference with the election process of the Board. In reversing the Board,
the court stated:
"We find from the record no evidence of a background of
employer hostility to union organization, or of improprieties in
the manner of conducting the interviews. Under the circumstances,
lacking any indication that any employee actually disbelieved the
employer's assurances (of freedom from reprisal) and felt in
some way restrained in the exercise of his rights, this record does
not support a conclusion of coercion or interference."' 7 9
In Bourne v. NLRB,1 0 the Second Circuit, in an effort to clarify
the somewhat hazy dividing line between lawful and unlawful interrogation, stated that interrogation, not itself threatening, is not an
unfair labor practice unless it meets certain standards. These include:
"(1) The background, i.e., is there a history of employer hostility and discrimination?
(2) The nature of the information sought, e.g., did the interrogator appear to be seeking information on which to base taking
action against individual employees? Were the questions specific,
such as 'Who are the ring leaders?' or 'Who has joined?', rather
than general, such as 'How is the union doing?' or 'Are the employees for the union?'
175. 317 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1963).
176. 317 F.2d at 228.
177. S. H. Kress & Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1244, 50 L.R.R.M. 1361 (1962).
178. 109 N.L.R.B. 591, 34 L.R.R.M. 1384 (1954).
179. 317 F.2d 225, 228 (9th Cir. 1963). See also Beaver Valley Canning Co. v.
NLRB, 332 F.2d 429 (8th Cir. 1964), where the Court in reversing the Board's finding
of Section 8(a) (1) violation held that isolated interrogation by an employer of employees in regard to a union, free of coercive statements and absent resort to systematic
intimidation, is not unlawful conduct per se. See also Salinas Valley Corp. v. NLRB,
334 F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1964).
180. 332 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1964).
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(3) The identity of the questioner, i.e., how high was he in the
company hierarchy?
(4) Place and method of interrogation, e.g., was employee called
from work to the boss's office? Was there an atmosphere of
'unnatural formality?'
(5) Truthfulness of the reply [i.e., were the employees' replies
evasive or untruthful, indicating that the interrogation actually
inspired fear ?]

",,s

Finding no evidence that the above standards had been met in the
case before it, the court set aside the Board's finding of unlawful
interrogation.
While the opinions in these two court cases are convincing, it is
certain that they do not represent Board policy. By way of caution,
it should be repeated that the Board has on many occasions stated that
it will determine for itself whether to acquiesce in the contrary views
of a Circuit Court of Appeals or whether, with due deference to the
Court's opinion, to adhere to its previous holding until the Supreme
Court of the United States rules otherwise."8 2
CONCLUSION

Criticism of the Board's policy in the area of employer "free

speech" has been widespread. 8 3 However, as recognized by Professor
Bok, "It is doubtless much easier to call attention to these problems
than to develop acceptable solutions."'8 4
It is submitted, nevertheless, that section 8(c) allows employers
to inform employees of the realities that may result from union representation in choosing whether to accept or reject a bargaining representative. Moreover, if the choice by employees as to union representation is to be rational, employees should be entitled to know the possible
consequences of strike action and how such action may affect them
and their future. They should be entitled to know the means provided

by law for an employer to follow when he disagrees with certain NLRB
action. The employer's bargaining attitude, the possibilities of losing
present customers, long and crippling strikes, replacement of strikers,
181. 332 F.2d at 48.
182. Iowa Beef Packers, Inc., 144 N.L.R.B. 64, 54 L.R.R.M. 1109 (1963); North
Country Motors, Ltd., 133 N.L.R.B. 1479, 1485, 49 L.R.R.M. 1049 (1961).
183. See, e.g., Kenneth C. McGuinness, THP Nnw FRONTIER NLRB, ch. V (1963)
Kammholz, Employer "Free Speech" and Employee Rights, 14 LAB. L.J. 318 (1963).
For views in opposition to those expressed by McGuinness and Kammholz, see comments of L. N. D. Wells, Jr., in report on symposium on "Recent Developments in
Labor Law" conducted by the Federal Bar Association and the Geo. U.L. Center,
54 L.R.R.M. 48, 82 (1963). For two recent addresses delivered by NLRB officials,
defending the Board's position, see partial text of speech "Free Speech Under the
National Labor Relations Act" delivered on March 19, 1964, by Assistant NLRB
General Counsel Elihu Platt, reported in 55 L.R.R.M. 105 (1964); and "Employer
Rights and Their Limitations During Union Organizational Campaigns," an address
delivered on January 29, 1964, by Howard W. Kleeb, Associate Executive Secretary
of the NLRB, reported in 55 L.R.R.M. 114 (1964).
184. Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under
the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. Rpv. 38, 141 (1964).
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all are significant factors which employees should be able to weigh in
making a reasoned choice. That employers and employees have diametrically opposed interests is by no means always the case. As stated
by Justice Brandeis:
"Don't assume that the interests of employer and employee are
necessarily hostile - that what is good for one is necessarily
bad for the other. The opposite is more apt to be the case. While
they have different interests, they are likely to prosper or suffer
together."'" 5
Since both are likely to prosper or suffer together, it is only fair
that an employer be given the opportunity to express to his employees
his view on the impact of unionization on the success of the business.
It is encouraging, therefore, to note that several recent Board decisions
appear to represent an acknowledgment of current criticism directed at
Board limitation on employer free speech."8 6 It is hoped that subsequent Board decisions will reflect a growing realization that employees
are entitled to base their decisions in representation elections on a frank
discussion of all of the relevant issues and that the purposes of the Act
are not served by a censorship which makes such discussion impossible.
185. MASON, BRANDEIS, A FRi; MAN'S LiFe 141 (1946).
186. See cases discussed at pages 33-35 supra.

